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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-3390
_______________________________
EDDIE WILSON,
Appellant
v.
EDWARD F. REILLY, JR.;
WARDEN MICHAEL PUGH
___________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-00770)
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III
______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 12, 2006
Before: MCKEE, FUENTES AND NYGAARD, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed : January 12, 2006)
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
In 1977, Eddie Wilson was convicted of first-degree murder and armed robbery in
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and was sentenced to a term of 28 years to
life imprisonment. In 1987, while incarcerated at the Department of Corrections prison in

Lorton, Virginia, Wilson was indicted for possession with intent to distribute a Schedule
IV controlled substance and possession of a knife. Although Wilson was subsequently
convicted of the drug offense, he was found not guilty of the knife offense. In May 2001,
after being transferred to the United States Penitentiary, Allenwood, Wilson received his
initial parole hearing before the United States Parole Commission (“the Commission”).
As is pertinent here, during the 2001 hearing the Hearing Examiner determined that
Wilson had committed new criminal conduct in a prison facility, specifically, possession
of a knife. Based on that finding, the Commission added an additional 12 to 16 months to
Wilson’s guideline range.
In May 2003, Wilson filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. In his petition, Wilson alleged only that
the Commission improperly assessed the 12 to 16 months for possession of a knife. As
relief, Wilson requested a “de novo hearing” before the Commission “to correct the
error.” By order entered June 19, 2003, the District Court summarily dismissed Wilson’s
petition. Wilson appealed. Finding summary dismissal of his petition inappropriate
under the circumstances, this Court vacated the District Court’s June 19, 2003, judgment
and remanded the matter for further proceedings in March 2004.1 C.A. No. 03-3462.
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Wilson is under the mistaken belief that in 2004 we: (1) found a due process
violation; (2) directed the District Court to grant his petition; and (3) determined that he
was entitled to parole in August 2003. To the contrary, we specifically “express[ed] no
opinion as to the ultimate merits” of Wilson’s claim, concluding only that summarily
dismissal was inappropriate. To that end, we remanded Wilson’s case to the District
2

Shortly thereafter, Wilson received a second parole hearing before the
Commission. By notice of action dated July 7, 2004, the Commission found that because
Wilson was a “more serious risk than indicated by [his] Base Point Score,” an upward
departure from the guideline range of 324 to 350 months was appropriate. The
Commission ordered a reconsideration hearing to be held in June 2007. Wilson then filed
in the District Court a “motion for the court to take judicial notice” that the Commission
acted “in a retaliatory and vindictive manner” when it again denied him parole. Finding
that the factual matter at issue was subject to reasonable dispute, Wilson’s motion was
denied by the District Court on August 12, 2004. Wilson’s motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied by the District Court on January 10, 2005.
The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss Wilson’s § 2241 petition. By order
entered January 19, 2005, the District Court denied the defendants’ motion and scheduled
an evidentiary hearing for February. However, on January 26, 2005, the Commission
reopened Wilson’s case and ordered that a special reconsideration hearing be held on
March 28, 2005, so that Wilson’s Current Total Guideline Range could be recalculated
without the 12 to 16 month assessment for possession of a knife. Because the defendants
agreed to provide Wilson with the relief sought in his § 2241 petition, i.e., a new hearing

Court “for further proceedings,” not with instructions for the District Court to grant
Wilson’s § 2241 petition. Likewise, although we noted Wilson’s “assert[ion] that in the
absence of the allegedly inaccurate 12 to 16 month assessment, his parole guideline range
expired in August 2003,” we clearly did not conclude that Wilson’s parole guideline
range expired in August 2003 or that he would be entitled to parole at that time.
3

before the Commission to correct the 12 to 16 month assessment, the District Court
dismissed Wilson’s § 2241 petition as moot by order entered January 28, 2005.
On February 7, 2005, Wilson filed a timely motion to reopen or to alter or amend
the January 28 judgment. While his motion was pending in the District Court, Wilson’s
special reconsideration hearing was conducted. At the hearing, the 12 to 16 month
assessment for possession of a knife was excluded, and Wilson’s guideline range was
reduced from 324 to 350 months to 312 to 324 months. On that basis, the Hearing
Examiner recommended a presumptive parole release date of October 26, 2006.
However, the Commission rejected the Hearing Examiner’s recommended presumptive
parole release date, instead determining that Wilson should remain confined pending a
three year reconsideration hearing in March 2008. Wilson then filed an supplement to his
February 7 motion, in which he argued that his due process rights were violated during
March 28 special reconsideration hearing because: (1) his attorney was not permitted to
attend the hearing; and (2) the Commission acted vindictively when it determined that he
would not be eligible for a new parole hearing until March 2008.
By order entered July 15, 2005, the District Court denied without prejudice
Wilson’s February 7 motion. Although it expressed concern about the fairness of
Wilson’s March 28 hearing, the District Court nonetheless concluded that there were no
grounds to reopen the matter or to modify the January 28 judgment insofar as Wilson had
clearly obtained the relief sought in his § 2241 petition. The District Court, however,
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explained that Wilson was free to file a new § 2241 petition challenging the March 28
hearing and attached to the order the appropriate forms.
Wilson has timely appealed the District Court’s August 12, 2004, and January 10,
January 28, and July 15, 2005, orders. Our review of the District Court’s decision to
dismiss Wilson’s § 2241 petition is plenary, see Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d
536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002), and we review the District Court’s orders denying his motions
for judicial review, to reopen and those filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) for an
abuse of discretion. See In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1323 (3d Cir.
2002) (motions for judicial review); United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir.
2002) (motions to reopen); Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir.
1999) (motions for reconsideration).
The Federal Rules of Evidence permit a District Court to take judicial notice of
facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 201(b). “A judicially
noticed fact must either be generally known within the jurisdiction of the trial court, or be
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be question.” Werner v. Werner, 267 F.3d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 2001). The facts
alleged by Wilson in his motion to take judicial notice fall far short of this standard.
Whether the Commission acted “in a retaliatory and vindictive manner” when it again
denied him parole in 2004 is neither a matter of common knowledge, nor is it easily
verifiable by resort to a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See,
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e.g., LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. First Conn. Holding Gr., LLC, 287 F.3d 279, 290-91 (3d Cir.
2002). Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Wilson’s motion to take judicial notice or his subsequent motion for reconsideration of
the August 12, 2004, order.
“[T]he exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or
controversy.” Chong v. District Dir., I.N.S., 264 F.3d 378, 383 (3d Cir. 2001). “[A] case
is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). A
court’s ability to grant effective relief lies at the heart of the mootness doctrine. County
of Morris v. Nationalist Mvmt., 273 F.3d 527 533 (3d Cir. 2001); see also In re Material
Witness Warrant Nichols, 77 F.3d 1277, 1270 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that mootness
means that it would be impossible to grant the petitioner any meaningful relief on his
claims). Thus, “[i]f developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a
plaintiff’s personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to
grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.” Blanciak v. Allegheny
Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996).
We agree with the District Court that events occurring subsequent to the filing of
Wilson’s § 2241 petition rendered his claim moot. In his § 2241 petition, Wilson
requested only a new parole hearing before the Commission to correct the assessment of
the 12 to 16 months for possession of a knife. On January 26, 2005, Wilson’s case was

6

reopened and a special reconsideration hearing ordered so that the 12 to 16 month
assessment could be removed from his guideline range. Thus, because the relief Wilson
sought in his petition had been provided, the District Court could fashion no reasonable
remedy for him. Under these circumstances, the District Court did not err in dismissing
Wilson’s § 2241 petition as moot.
Likewise, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilson’s
motion for reconsideration of the January 28, 2005, order. As the District Court correctly
noted, in order to obtain reconsideration, Wilson had to show an intervening change in the
law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error of law or fact to
prevent a manifest injustice. Max’s Seafood Café, 176 F.3d at 677. Here, Wilson does
not allege an intervening change in the controlling law. Instead, he contends both that his
motion for reconsideration was supported by new evidence and that the District Court’s
decision to dismiss his § 2241 petition resulted in manifest injustice. First, even if Wilson
offered new evidence in his motion for reconsideration and supplement thereto, the
evidence did not warrant reconsideration of the District Court’s January 28 order. The
“new evidence” offered by Wilson related only to his March 28 reconsideration hearing.
Thus, it had no bearing on whether the District Court erred in dismissing Wilson’s § 2241
petition as moot. See generally United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir.
2003) (explaining that a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration is, inter alia, a “device to
relitigate the original issue decided by the district court”) (citations and quotations
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omitted). Furthermore, as discussed herein, because Wilson’s § 2241 petition became
moot during the pendency of his action, the District Court’s January 28 order did not
constitute manifest injustice.
Finally, we note that as the District Court explained in its July 15, 2005, order,
Wilson may file a new § 2241 petition raising any alleged constitutional violations
stemming from his March 28, 2005, reconsideration hearing.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s January 28, 2005,
order.
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